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Sammendrag: 
 I den økonomiske faglitteraturen blir det ofte forutsatt 
at Kyotoprotokollen vil bli iverksatt gjennom et 
kostnadseffektivt og altomfattende system for 
kvotehandel. Erfaringene med gjennomføring av andre 
miljøtiltak viser imidlertid at myndighetene ofte velger 
en mer differensiert tilnærming. Planleggingen av 
gjennomføringen av Kyotoprotokollen bekrefter dette; 
utslippsforpliktelsene vil bli differensiert mellom 
sektorer. Denne artikkelen analysere 
velferdskostnadene knyttet til gjennomføringen av 
EUs kvotehandelsdirektiv – eller et tilsvarende 
differensiert kvotesystem for andre land. Artikkelen 
analysere også hvordan differensieringen av 
forpliktelsene påvirker de sektorene som har en 
kvoteforpliktelse sammenlignet med de som er fritatt. 
Resultatene indikerer at den sektorelle 
differensieringen kommer med en relativt høy pris – 
sammenlignet med et altomfattende system, blir 
kostnadene ved gjennomføring mer enn tredoblet i alle 
scenarier. Samtidig oppnår de sektorene som blir 
fritatt kun begrensede fordeler.  
 
Abstract:  
It is often assumed in the economic literature that the 
Kyoto Protocol will be implemented through a cost-
efficient, comprehensive emissions trading system. 
However, the general experience from implementation 
of environmental policies suggests that governments 
will adopt a more differentiated approach. Emerging 
evidence on how the Kyoto Protocol will be 
implemented confirms this: climate commitments will 
be differentiated between sectors. This paper assesses 
the welfare effects associated with implementing the 
EU emissions trading Directive – or a similar scheme 
for other regions. It also analyses how differentiation 
of commitments affects the sectors that have a permit 
obligation compared to those that are exempted from 
it. Findings indicate that sectoral differentiation comes 
at a relatively high welfare cost – in all scenarios more 
than tripling the cost of implementing climate policy, 
with only limited benefits to the sectors that are 
granted concessions 
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1 Introduction  
The industrialized countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol have committed to reducing 
their annual emissions of six greenhouse gases by around 5% by the first commitment period 
(2008-2012) as compared to their emissions in 1990. The Protocol also establishes three so-
called flexibility mechanisms – emissions trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean 
Development Mechanism – that allow Parties to acquire cheap emission permits from other 
states that can be used to comply with their commitments. The use of these mechanisms 
should, however, be “supplemental” to domestic action.  
Standard economic theory predicts that, in the absence of any pre-existing distortions,  a 
policy that equalizes marginal abatement costs across all sources will achieve emission 
reductions at least cost. In much of the economic literature, it is assumed that governments 
will adopt such a theoretically ideal means of achieving their Kyoto Protocol commitments. 
Given the options available, this means that the required emission reductions should be 
achieved through a comprehensive emissions trading system that includes as many sectors 
(and gases) as possible and puts no restrictions on emissions trading with other Annex B 
countries, or on the use of credits from project-based mechanisms. However, this is certain to 
be the most efficient implementation only if pre-existing distortions are removed at the same 
time.  
There are, however, few examples of governments implementing the theoretically ideal 
environmental policy instruments. More generally, due to political concern about issues such 
as loss of competitiveness or work places, or high transaction costs, exemptions have been 
granted to particular sectors.  
For example, the Norwegian CO2 tax, which was introduced in 1991 as the first in the 
world of its kind, includes numerous exceptions. The tax is levied on the use of mineral oil, 
petrol, coal and coke (Ministry of Finance 2002). Mineral oil for use in international flights, 
ships in foreign trade, fishing vessels operating in Norwegian waters and coal and coke as raw 
materials or reducing agents in industrial processes is fully exempted from this tax. Due to 
competitiveness concerns domestic flights and the paper and pulp industry pay the tax at a 
reduced rate.  
The emerging evidence suggests that exceptions will be granted also when it comes to 
national implementation of the Kyoto Protocol; governments will not choose a fully 
comprehensive trading system, but rather one that is sectorally differentiated.  
For example, both the EU and Norway are planning for a combination of emissions trading 
for some industries and other measures, such as taxes, technical standards or voluntary 
agreements for other industries. The paper will focus exclusively on the recently adopted EU 
Emissions Trading (EU-ET) Directive. It is a particularly relevant example both because the 
EU is likely to be the biggest regional emissions trading scheme1, and because it is the 
scheme that has come the furthest towards implementation with most of the details known. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the welfare cost of implementing a climate 
agreement with sectoral differentiation of commitments to an agreement with theoretically 
ideal implementation, and also to assess the effects of exemption upon specific sectors. 
Unlike earlier work in this field, this paper will focus on a specific scheme that is about to be 
implemented – the EU-ET scheme. Section 3 begins by looking at what theory and previous 
experience has to say on the issue of efficient implementation of environmental policy. This is 
followed by a look at the details of the EU-ET Directive and some explanations for why the 
1 According to the UNFCCC national greenhouse gas inventory data for 1990, the EU-25 countries 
were responsible for 46% of total Annex B emissions (without the USA and Australia).   
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EU ended up with sectoral differentiation. Section 4 introduces the DEEP model that will be 
used to quantify the cost of sectoral differentiation by comparing a number of scenarios. 
Section 5 presents the model results, in terms of both welfare effects and the impact on the 
sectors that are granted concessions, and those that are not. Finally, section 6 concludes on the 
consequences of sectoral differentiation.  
2 Ideal and real emissions trading systems 
2.1 Theoretical requirements and previous experiences 
Boemare and Quirion (2002) review ten emissions trading systems that are either 
implemented or being planned. On the issue of sectoral coverage the authors note that 
standard theory suggests that as many emitters as possible should be included. This is 
provided that the location of emissions does not matter and that administrative and monitoring 
costs are not disproportionately large. There are two main reasons to include as many emitters 
as possible. First, by including a large number of emitters you increase the scope for 
efficiency gains as there will be larger differences in abatement costs between firms. Second, 
it lowers the risk that any participant will be able to manipulate the market as a monopolistic 
seller or monopsonistic buyer. However, the authors find that in most cases regulators have 
chosen not to include as many emitters as possible, at least not initially. They argue that this 
might be to avoid facing too much opposition at one time, and to begin with the simplest 
system possible. As a means to reduce the problems associated with implementing a large 
system at once, they suggest that phasing in different industries over time can expand 
coverage and achieve the most comprehensible system possible.  
Babiker et al. (2000) study the effects of differentiating climate policy by sector. They 
employ a CGE model to run a set of scenarios. They argue that while a policy that yields 
equal abatement costs across all sources would be ideal, actual policies rarely approach this 
ideal. One reason is that an across-the-board scheme may lead to shifts in international 
competitiveness among sectors and to variations in burden among sub-national regions. The 
authors argue that it is the fear of these effects that leads to the granting of concessions 
(differentiation). They then move on to study the economic effects of granting such 
concessions for a range of scenarios – where different sectors receive concessions (such as 
sectors heavily involved in international trade, energy intensive sectors and households and 
agriculture). Babiker and his colleagues find that granting these concessions would amount to 
an increase in the welfare loss in meeting the US Kyoto commitments by between 32% and 
300%. Furthermore, they find that exemption from the scheme does not necessarily improve 
the competitiveness of all the sectors that are exempted, and that the value added decreases in 
all sectors that are not exempted. They conclude that sectorally differentiated policies can 
increase the cost of meeting a carbon emissions target. 
Babiker et al. (2001) look at the welfare costs of hybrid carbon policies in the EU. While 
numerical studies find that equalizing marginal abatement costs across sectors greatly reduces 
the cost of achieving a given target, they show that in the presence of pre-existing tax 
distortions, other allocations may be preferable in some cases. The paper focuses on domestic 
carbon policies in EU countries, and without emissions trading among countries. They look at 
three different burden sharing systems: economy-wide trading; a scheme where each sector is 
assigned an equal share of overall reductions (without trading among sectors); and a scheme 
where each sector is assigned a target based on estimates of abatement costs (no trading 
among sectors). They find that equalizing marginal abatement costs across sectors can greatly 
reduce the cost of achieving the target in all EU countries. However, they also show that 
welfare costs can be reduced in some countries compared to the economy-wide trading 
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scheme. A carbon tax interacts with other taxes and effectively increases existing fuel taxes. 
While the first-best solution is to remove the pre-existing distortions, they find that “over-
allocating” permits to the heavily taxed sectors and not allowing trade can be an improvement 
over an economy-wide cap and trade system (if distortionary taxes are not removed). 
Babiker and his colleagues then go on to consider strategies that might limit the impact of a 
carbon constraint on exports from energy intensive sectors. They compare exempting these 
sectors from the climate policy (requiring other sectors to reduce more) with a tax-cum-
subsidy policy (where the energy intensive sector is subsidized at a level equal to the amount 
of carbon tax it pays). They find that exempting this sector causes a welfare loss in excess of 
1% to the entire economy, and that the tax-cum-subsidy policy is Pareto superior to making 
the exemption. 
2.2 The EU Emissions Trading Directive 
The EU Emissions Trading (EU-ET) Directive was adopted on 13 October 2003 by the 
European Parliament and Council (European Parliament and Council 2003).2 The Directive 
establishes a scheme for EU emissions trading in greenhouse gases for the purpose of 
achieving cost-effective emissions reductions. It will be implemented in two phases. The first 
phase is a preparatory phase during the three-year period 2005-2007, while the second phase 
coincides with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012).  
Under the Directive emission reduction commitments are differentiated between sectors. 
Certain industries have a permit obligation, while other industries are exempted from this 
obligation. The sectors included in the scheme are:  
• energy activities (power plants, mineral oil refineries and coke ovens) 
• production and processing of ferrous metals 
• the mineral industry (including cement and glass) 
• other activities (paper and pulp).  
Within these sectors, participation is mandatory for installations above certain given 
capacity thresholds. The Directive does, however, allow installations to opt-out during the 
preparatory phase (Article 27). On the other hand, Member States are allowed to include 
installations below the capacity threshold from 2005, and can include more activities, 
installations and greenhouse gases from 2008 (Article 24).  
During the first phase the Directive covers only CO2 emissions. According to Convery et 
al. (2003), the sectors included are responsible for 46% of European Union CO2 emissions 
and 38% of total greenhouse gas emissions.3 What exact proportion it makes up will depend 
on how many allowances are issued. This issue is left for each Member State to decide. The 
Member States are, however, restricted by the Directive in that the total quantity of permits 
allocated must be “consistent with the Members State’s obligation to limit its emissions” 
(Annex 3, Directive). During the preparatory phase at least 95% of the allowances must be 
allocated free of charge, while during the second phase at least 90% must be allocated free of 
charge.  
A final issue of cost-efficiency is the degree to which installations or Member States are 
allowed to buy cheap allowances or credits from other countries. Article 25 of the Directive 
2 The EU Emissions Trading Directive will hereafter be referred to as the Directive. All mention of 
Articles refers to the Articles of the Directive.  
3 The EU-ET scheme covers 36% of total emissions in our model - which includes methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions in addition to CO2, but does not exclude installations below the capacity thresholds.  
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states that “agreements should be concluded with third countries listed in Annex B to the 
Kyoto Protocol […] to provide for the mutual recognition of allowances…” The Directive 
does not state exactly how this “linking” will take place, only that the Commission shall draw 
up any necessary provisions. Furthermore, the Directive states that emission credits from the 
project mechanisms (i.e. CDM and JI) will be recognised under the scheme. The details are 
left up to further provisions – which have now taken the shape of a proposed “linking” 
directive. The text of this directive was adopted by the European Parliament on 20 April 
2004. The “linking” directive states that “the use of [credits from CDM and JI projects] from 
2008 is allowed up to a percentage of the allocation to each installation, to be specified by 
each Member State in its National Allocation Plan” (European Parliament 2004).  
2.3 Why the EU chose sectoral differentiation 
In many regards the EU-ET Directive is theoretically efficient. It includes many installations, 
it does not put any restrictions on trading with other Annex B countries, and it does allow the 
use of credits (but leaves it up to each Member State to set a ceiling on the use of credits). 
What is of interest in this paper, however, are the exemptions that were granted to certain 
sectors, and what this means for the overall efficiency of the scheme.  
The Commission explains its reasons for choosing a system of limited coverage in an 
explanatory memorandum (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). The 
Commission puts emphasis on trying to keep the Directive as simple as possible, and to 
minimise distortions in the market. The concern for the competitiveness of EU industries is 
clearly revealed in statements such as “emissions trading is, first, an instrument for 
environmental protection, and, second, one of the policy instruments that will impair 
competitiveness the least” (Commission, 2001, p.2).   
According to the memorandum, the sectoral coverage of the Directive “builds upon the 
framework of regulation arising from the IPPC Directive.” The Commission explains why 
certain sectors were not included: “The decision not to include the chemical sector initially is 
taken for two reasons: first, the chemical sector’s direct emissions of carbon dioxide are not 
so significant […]. Second, the number of chemical installations in the Community is high, in 
the order of 34 000 plants, and their inclusion would substantially increase the administrative 
complexity of the scheme” (Commission, 2001, p. 10).  
The memorandum is very clear on why only CO2 emissions were included in the Directive: 
“Inclusion of the other greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol is desirable but would 
be dependent on resolving monitoring, reporting and verification issues […]. In particular, 
emissions trading presupposes a sufficiently accurate monitoring of emissions, but the 
monitoring uncertainties are still too great for greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide. 
For these reasons, emissions of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide are not included 
in the first phase of the scheme” (Commission, 2001, p. 9).  
The EU’s stated motivations for choosing this specific emissions trading scheme should of 
course not be taken just at face value. While the Directive is very recent, there are already 
some papers that critically discuss the motivations behind the choices made by the EU.  
Christiansen and Wettestad (2003) discuss how the EU changed its position on emissions 
trading from sceptic to frontrunner. They also look at the then proposed EU-ET scheme. They 
argue that it was necessary to start with only a few sectors and CO2 only to “reduce 
complexity and ensure expediency in the policymaking process” (Christiansen and Wettestad, 
2003, p.16). They therefore seem to accept the arguments of the Commission for choosing a 
limited system, but they argue that the limitations on gas and sectoral coverage “could impair 
the effectiveness of the system in several ways. First, it could reduce cost-effectiveness. 
Second, it will not provide indications of abatement costs for sectors outside the system, 
which may prevent early action for outsiders” (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003, p.14). One 
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way of interpreting this is that the Commission anticipated lobbyist opposition, and rather 
than pick this fight, offered to grant concessions up-front.  
Markussen and Svendsen (2005) analyse how industry lobbying has shaped the EU-ET 
Directive by looking at changes between the initial Green Paper proposal (before lobbying) 
and the final directive (after lobbying). On the issue of coverage, they find that the chemistry 
and aluminium sector managed to avoid getting a permit obligation. The authors argue that 
the reason for granting this concession was “administrative and concerns about their 
international competitiveness” (Markussen and Svendsen, p.9) The chemistry sector itself 
argued that a permit obligation would “constrain their competitiveness and ability to grow” 
(Markussen and Svendsen, p.8), while for the case of the aluminium sector the official reason 
was that the sector mainly emits other greenhouse gases than CO2.  
To return to Boemare and Quirion (2002), they suggest that while process emissions from 
the chemical industry are not included in the EU-ET Directive, these emissions are likely to 
be phased in over time. The same is true for other non-CO2 gases. They argue that a more 
comprehensive (and upstream) system was excluded for political reasons – because it would 
have looked too much like a tax.  
The remaining chapters of this paper analyse the welfare cost of the EU-ET scheme 
compared to a fully comprehensive scheme (i.e. theoretically most efficient). Because 
concern for competitiveness figures high on the list of motivations that can explain the 
exemptions granted under the EU-ET scheme, the effects of being included in or exempted 
from the scheme will also be assessed. In other words, the question is “what is the welfare 
cost to society of choosing a scheme of limited coverage, compared to a fully comprehensive 
scheme”, and furthermore “what are the gains to the sectors that are exempted?”  
3 Model and scenarios 
3.1 The DEEP model 
The DEEP model is a multi-sector, multi-region, multi-gas dynamic CGE model programmed 
in MPSGE. The structure of supply and demand has been adopted from the GTAP-EG model 
by Rutherford and Paltsev (2000), with some modifications.  The model is utility maximising 
with a growth benchmark. A full description of the model is provided in  Kallbekken (2004).  
The economic data used in the DEEP model is the GTAP (v5) data base – which provides 
input-output data for each region, bilateral trade data, and information on taxes and tariffs. 
The interaction of emissions trading with pre-existing taxes, which was the main focus of 
Babiker et al. (2001), is therefore included in the model.  
The DEEP model includes emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O. The emissions data is from the 
GTAP/EPA project “Towards an Integrated Data Base for Assessing the Potential for 
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation”. The growth and technological change parameters in the model 
are based on the IPCC SRES A1B scenario (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000).4  
3.2 Policy scenarios 
Much is yet to be decided before the Kyoto Protocol can be implemented. While the EU 
already has adopted it’s emissions trading Directive, it still has the option of including more 
sectors, and gases, by 2008. All the other Annex B countries also have to decide on the design 
4 The SRES A1B scenario assumes “rapid and successful economic development”, where the global 
economy grows at an average annual rate of 3%, and where technological progress is rapid. 
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of their emissions trading systems. The Norwegian government announced in March 2004 
that it would propose a system based on the EU-ET scheme (Ministry of the Environment 
2004).5 Because these differentiated schemes make interesting case studies, Norway is 
included as a separate region in the model – alongside the EU, the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) countries, and all other Annex B countries (grouped into one region).6  
While it would have been interesting to include the early phase of the EU-ET scheme, this 
is not done for two major reasons. The first reason is that the National Allocation Plans have 
proved to give rather generous emission allowances, with the result that the early phase will 
not yield substantial emission reductions. The second reason is that, as a policy issue, it is of 
greater interest to analyse schemes yet to be finalized, than those finalised but not yet 
implemented. All policy cases are therefore concerned with the implementation of the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012).  
The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost of a differentiated emissions trading 
scheme, taking the EU-ET scheme as an example, to a fully comprehensive scheme. It is also 
of interest to assess alternative differentiated schemes. The model will therefore be run with 
three different policy cases:  
The first policy case is a differentiated scheme identical to the EU-ET scheme (which is 
also the short name for this scenario). This is, however, the EU-ET scheme as it stands today; 
with no new gases or sectors added. This policy case makes the strong assumption that all the 
required emission reductions will be achieved through the emissions trading scheme, i.e. that 
no emission reduction measures are implemented in any other sectors. This is done in order 
for the effects of other measures not to cloud the analysis and the comparisons made.  
The second policy case is an alternative differentiated scheme that is an extended version of 
the EU-ET scheme: The scheme is extended to cover the aluminium (non-ferrous metal) and 
chemical sectors. This scenario makes it possible to assess the effects of exemption for two 
sectors that were granted exemptions due to competitiveness concerns (see above discussion). 
This scenario is called extended.  
The third policy case is an idealized, fully comprehensive emissions trading scheme that in 
principle should achieve the emission targets at least cost (named comprehensive).7 Here, 
“comprehensive emissions trading scheme” means that all sectors and all Kyoto gases are 
included. The DEEP model includes carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide emissions – 
which accounted for 98.6% of EU emissions in 2001 (European Environment Agency 2003), 
but not the three other Kyoto gases (HFC, PFC and SF6).  
All policy cases assume that no hot air from former Soviet Union countries will be sold 
during the first commitment period. Also, they assume that there will be no banking of 
permits. These are simplifying assumptions; because very little is known about a possible 
second commitment period, this paper does not to make any explicit assumptions about a 
second period. The effect of excluding hot air sales is to increase the permit price, and the 
5 The reason the government gave for scrapping a more ambitious scheme and instead copying the EU-
ET scheme was concern for avoiding negative effects on the competitiveness of Norwegian 
industries. The process industry, which was supposed to take part in emissions trading in the original 
Norwegian proposal, instead entered into a voluntary agreement with the government.  
6 The GTAP region “Rest of EFTA” consists of Iceland and Liechtenstein as well as Norway. 
However, Norway accounts for 94% of both GDP and CO2 emissions in this region..  
7 Such a scheme would achieve the target at least cost in the absence of pre-existing distortions, but not 
necessarily when they are present – which they are in this model.  
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effect of excluding banking is to decrease the permit price.8 These two assumptions therefore 
offset each other to some extent.9  
In addition to these three policy cases, a reference case will be run with business-as-usual 
(BAU) emissions, i.e. where no emission constraints are imposed. This case is referred to as 
BAU. 
4 Results 
4.1 Welfare effects 
The major results of the scenarios are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Prices are always given as 
net present value (USD 1997). All relevant taxes and tariffs are included in the prices.  
  As one might expect, the permit prices are significantly higher in the scenarios with 
differentiated commitments than in the comprehensive emissions trading scenarios. With a 
differentiated scheme the permit price is USD 21.8 (per ton CO2-equivalent). Extending the 
scheme to include the aluminium and chemical sector, reduces the permit price to USD 18.7 
With a fully comprehensive scheme the permit price is as low as USD 4.8. 
 
Table 1 Permit prices (USD1997 per ton CO2e) 
EU-ET 21.8 
Extended 18.7 
Comprehensive 4.8 
 
Table 2 Welfare effect of emissions trading system 
                       (percent change real income, compared to BAU)  
 EU-ET Extended Comprehensive 
EU -0.87 -0.83 -0.04 
Norway -1.30 -1.27 -0.41 
RAB -0.64 -0.61 -0.16 
FSU +0.85 -0.09 -1.02 
 
  Compared to the BAU case, introducing a policy that imposes emission constraints in a 
model where climate damages are not included will result in a welfare loss. The welfare cost 
of implementing the EU-ET scheme is found to be a 0.87% reduction in real income 
                                                     
8 Banking can only increase the price in the first period, not decrease it. Whether or not this will happen 
depends on future permit prices (which are not modelled in this paper).  
9 The total number of permits available is 2.64 Mt CO2-equivalent. This compares to a figure of 2.74 
Mt for the model used in the paper by Kallbekken and Westskog (2003 – unpublished data), where 
both hot air sales and banking was included.  
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compared to the situation with no climate policy (BAU).10 Implementing the extended 
scheme would marginally reduce the welfare loss to the EU - to 0.83%. This can be compared 
to a welfare loss of 0.04% if a fully comprehensive emissions trading scheme was 
implemented.  
Similar figures are found for Norway. The welfare cost of implementing the EU-ET 
scheme is 1.30%. This compares to a welfare loss of 1.27% with the extended scheme, and a 
still significant 0.41% with the comprehensive scheme.  
For the “Rest of Annex B” (RAB) region, where Japan and Canada are the dominating 
economies, the differences between the different policy scenarios are less dramatic: The 
welfare loss of implementing the EU-ET scheme would be 0.64%, or 0.61% with the 
extended scheme, as compared to a loss of 0.16% with a comprehensive scheme.  
Most studies find that Russia gains from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol (as 
compared to the business as usual scenario). This is due to hot air sales. However, because 
this study assumes no hot air sales, this gain does not materialise. Only in the EU -ET 
scenario, where Russia’s business-as-usual emission constraint means that Russia can 
dominate the international supply of permits, does Russia gain from implementation.  
The reason why the differentiated schemes, in general, have a higher welfare cost than the 
comprehensive schemes is that they introduce (new) inefficiencies in the economy. While the 
same emission target is to be achieved, some of the (cheaper) abatement options are no longer 
available, making it more costly to meet this target. This inefficiency has strong implications 
in terms of shifting activity between sectors – an issue that will be addressed in the following 
section. 
These results show that, assuming that transaction costs are not prohibitive, there should be 
considerable scope for welfare improvement by extending the current EU-ET scheme, or any 
similar schemes, before implementation in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.  
4.2 Economic effects by sectors 
The previous section has showed that exempting sectors from the permit obligation causes a 
welfare loss. One important rationale for doing this was to protect the competitiveness of the 
exempted sectors. This section examines whether exemption produces this intended result, 
and also what the consequences are for sectors that are given a permit obligation. Table 3 
shows changes in output and (market) prices for some of the most important sectors. The 
results for the three policy scenarios are in each case compared to the BAU scenario.  
The results are not very surprising if we look at the emission-intensive sectors in the EU-
ET scenario; market prices increase and demand decreases (with a matching reduction in 
output). The decreasing demand is both a result of the increased price, and for the fossil fuels 
also a result of the increased cost of using them in sectors covered by the scheme (notably the 
electricity sector). While the absolute size of the output reduction is massive (32.9% for coal 
and 13.5% for electricity), this is also not very surprising in light of the very restrictive 
emissions reduction assumptions (all reductions take place inside the scheme). What is more 
interesting is that output of coal is reduced by a factor of three more than output of refined oil. 
This is not reflected in the changes in market prices for these goods (the changes are minor 
compared to the shifts in output). The explanation is that a large share of the coal is used in 
the electricity sector – which now has to pay for its CO2 emissions. Refined oil is used to a 
much lesser extent in electricity generation, and it is also a less carbon intensive fuel.  
10 Welfare is measured as change in real income across all time periods of the model – with a 
correction for the endowment effect of allocating permits; which have money-value but no real 
economic value.  
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Comparing the EU-ET scheme and the comprehensive schemes shows that the sectors that 
are included in the EU-ET scheme experience a significantly higher price increase, and 
associated decrease in demand, than those who are exempted.11 Take the example of the 
electricity sector (power plants): While it is responsible for only 1.2% of total output in the 
EU, it is responsible for 73% of the emissions covered by the EU-ET scheme. This has a big 
impact on prices, which increase by 25.8% in the EU-ET scheme. Output is reduced by 
13.5%.  
Changes in market prices do not say much about the effect on competitiveness. However, 
as the model employs a zero profit condition (as is common in the CGE literature), changes in 
profit levels can unfortunately not be observed. It is still possible to get some indication of 
what happens to competitiveness though by looking at the changes in output together with 
changes in the unit cost (less the cost of emission permits). Table 4 shows changes in unit cost 
for some sectors under the different scenarios. We observe that once again coal seems to be 
the big loser; The adjusted price is down 19.1%. For refined oil and electricity the adjusted 
price is down by only ~1%. For the other sectors that are included in the scheme (ferrous 
metals, minerals and paper and pulp) we observe a price increase also in the adjusted price. 
This is due to the increased price of inputs. 
Table 3 Percentage change in price and output in EU (compared to BAU) 
 
Sector 
 
Change in output (%) 
 
Change in price (%) 
 EU-
ET Extended compr. 
EU-
ET Extended compr. 
Coal -32.9 -31.5 -16.3 -0.4 -0.4 +1.4 
Refined oil -10.3 -8.8 -2.9 +3.7 +3.0 +0.7 
Electricity -13.5 -12.2 -4.2 +25.8 +22.3 +6.3 
Minerals -1.2 -1.1 -0.4 +1.4 +1.2 +0.3 
Ferrous metals -2.7 -2.4 -0.7 +4.7 +4.0 +1.0 
EU
-E
T 
Paper and pulp -1.1 -1.1 -0.4 +0.9 +0.7 0.0 
 Aluminium  +0.1 -0.6 +0.1 +2.1 +2.4 +0.7 
 
Ex
te
nd
ed
 
Chemical  -1.2 -1.7 -0.4 +0.7 +1.2 +0.2 
  Other man. & servs. -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 +0.0 0.0 +0.0 
  
Crude oil -7.4 -6.3 -2.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 
  
C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 
Agriculture  -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 0.0 +0.3 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
11 One exception to the general picture is the coal sector – where both output and prices decrease. The 
cost of coal extraction does not change much. But the demand for coal decreases significantly. This 
is because while it does not become more expensive to buy coal, it does become much more 
expensive to use it (particularly for the electricity sector which is the dominant coal user) due to the 
requirement of holding permits. This shifts the demand curve down, decreasing both the price and 
output at the new market equilibrium. Note that the producer price of coal (table 4) decreases, as you 
would expect when demand decreases.  
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Table 4     Percentage change in unit cost  
                           (adjusted for cost of permits and compared to BAU) 
 
Sector 
Change in price (%) 
 
EU-ET Extended compr. 
Coal -19.1 % -16.4 % -2.7 % 
Refined oil -1.2 % -1.2 % -0.4 % 
Electricity -0.7 % -0.4 % +0.4 % 
Minerals +0.6 % +0.6 % +0.2 % 
Ferrous metals +2.0 % +1.7 % +0.4 % 
EU
-E
T 
Paper and pulp +0.9 % +0.7 % 0.0 % 
 Aluminium  - 0.0 % 0.0 % 
 
Ex
te
nd
ed
 
Chemical  - -0.4 % -1.3 % 
  Other man. & servs.  - - -0.2 % 
  
Crude oil - - 0.0 % 
  
C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 
Agriculture  - - 0.0 % 
 
   The impact on the exempted sectors under the EU-ET scenario is minimal, with the 
exception of the aluminium and chemical sectors. Prices in the chemical sector go up by 0.7% 
and output is down 1.2%. Prices in the aluminium sector are also up, by 2.1%, but in this case 
output also increases. This happens because the price of aluminium substitutes, such as 
ferrous metals, increases even more (4.7% in this case).  
For the extended policy scenario the results are much the same for the sectors already 
discussed. The price increases and output reductions are, however, somewhat smaller due to 
the lower permit price. What is interesting about this scenario is the effect on the aluminium 
and the chemical sector of being included. Do the sectors gain when they are granted 
exception from the emissions trading scheme?  
The results show that prices in the chemical sector increase by 0.5 percentage points, and 
the resulting shift in demand results in a decreased output of 0.7 percentage points (as 
compared to the EU-ET scenario). It turns out that prices in the aluminium sector increase by 
a mere 0.3 percentage point compared to the EU-ET scenario, and output decreases by 0.7 
percentage points. While the initial reaction might be that aluminium would seem to be price 
sensitive, it is important to keep in mind that at the same time as the price increases slightly in 
the aluminium sector, prices go down in the sectors that were included under the EU-ET 
scenario, and demand for these goods increases in response.  
Both sectors seem to fare better under the EU-ET scenario, as output is higher for both 
sectors, and the unit cost is also higher for the aluminium sector, in this scenario.. However, 
revenue is only 0.53% higher in the EU-ET scenario, and the two sectors make up only 3.3% 
of the total value of output in the EU. The small gain obtained by exempting these two sectors 
(without being able to say exactly what happens to profits), should be compared to a loss of 
0.04% of total real income if the EU-ET scheme is chosen over the extended scheme.  
While the aluminium and chemical sectors do seem to gain somewhat if they are exempted, 
this is not true for all other sectors. If we look at the crude oil sector, which is exempted under 
the EU-ET scheme, we see that the price is down 0.4%, and output is down by 7.4%. The 
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reason why both price and output decreases at the same time, is that most of the crude oil is 
used as an input in the refined oil sector – which is not exempted, and where output decreases 
quite significantly (10.3%). As demand for refined oil decreases (because of the increased 
price), so does the demand for crude oil – as a major input to the refined oil sector. 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analyses were carried out for some of the key parameters and policy assumptions 
in the model. Because the main focus of this paper is to compare the welfare effects of 
implementing a differentiated scheme (EU-ET) to a comprehensive emissions trading scheme, 
all results will refer directly to this comparison. This is also done because changing for 
example the growth rates will have a great effect on welfare, and using absolute numbers 
would therefore cloud the analysis.  
The sensitivity analysis was carried out on two key parameters and one policy assumption. 
The first key parameter is the annual growth parameter. The growth rates in the original 
model are based on the SRES A1B scenario, and in the sensitivity analysis the annual, 
regional growth rates (benchmark) were increased and decreased by 1%. These two analyses 
are called high-growth and low-growth.  
The second key parameter was the elasticities of substitution between coal and liquid fuels, 
and between refined oil and gas. These elasticities are 0.5 and 2, respectively, in the original 
model. The elasticities were increase to 0.8 and 3 for the elastic analysis, and were decreased 
to 0.2 and 1 for the inelastic analysis.  
Finally, the assumption that no hot air will be sold was relaxed, and the former Soviet 
Union countries were allowed to sell all their hot air. This analysis is called hot air.  
Table 5 shows these welfare losses for each of the five sensitivity analyses and also with 
the original assumptions. The table shows that the results are robust; for the permit buying 
regions, the EU-ET scheme invariably creates a larger welfare loss than a comprehensive 
scheme. Norway is always the region that loses the most by choosing the differentiated 
scheme over the comprehensive. The reason for this is that in Norway only a very small share 
of emissions are covered by the differentiated scheme.  
Table 5     Sensitivity analysis of welfare losses  
                      (EU-ET compared to comprehensive scheme) 
 (% change) Original High-
growth 
Low-
growth 
Elastic Inelastic Hot air 
EU -0.83 -1.02 -0.41 -0.59 -0.72 -0.44 
Norway -0.89 -1.37 -0.59 -0.79 -1.02 -0.84 
RAB -0.48 -0.79 -0.28 -0.43 -0.54 -0.31 
FSU +1.87 +3.90 +0.51 +1.62 +2.19 +1.16 
 
The former Soviet Union countries are always better off if all regions choose the 
differentiated scheme. This is because, even with the assumption of no hot air sales, the 
region remains a permit seller and is better off the more restrictive the emission constraints in 
other regions.  
As you might expect, the welfare losses are larger when the economic growth is higher. 
The reason being that with more rapid economic growth the emission targets become more 
stringent, and therefore more costly to achieve. The opposite is true when economic growth is 
less rapid.  
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One might also predict that higher elasticities would decrease the welfare loss (both in 
absolute numbers and compared to a comprehensive scheme). The reason being that choosing 
a less efficient scheme is less costly when abatement is cheaper (as a result of higher 
elasticities). The results confirm this intuition for the elastic analysis. For the inelastic 
analysis the opposite is true – except when it comes to the EU. The EU seems to experience a 
smaller welfare loss when elasticities are lower. However, results for single regions cannot 
always be expected to be in line with the general intuition, as trade allows benefits to be 
redistributed when the competitive situation changes.  
Finally, with hot air sales the permit price is significantly lower – and in relative terms it is 
reduced by the greatest factor in the EU-ET scenario - and the welfare losses are consequently 
smaller.  
Table 6 presents the permit prices for the sensitivity analyses. Again the results are what we 
would expect; there is a positive correlation between economic growth and permit prices, and 
there is a negative correlation between substitution elasticities and permit prices. Allowing 
hot air sales decreases the permit price to as little as USD 0.7 for the EU-ET scheme, and 11.1 
for the comprehensive scheme. This is not very surprising, as the overall emission reduction 
target is significantly relaxed.  
Table 6  Sensitivity analysis: permit prices (USD 1997 per ton CO2e) 
(USD) Original High-
growth 
Low-
growth 
Elastic Inelastic Hot air 
Differentiated 21.8 31.1 14.3 19.9 23.9 11.1 
Comprehensive 4.8 10.6 0.8 4.4 5.4 0.7 
5 Discussion – the consequences of sectoral differentiation 
That a policy that equalizes marginal abatement costs across all sources should achieve 
emission reductions at least cost is something of a truism in environmental economics. What 
this paper does is to highlight just how great the welfare loss can be if a differentiated 
emissions trading scheme is implemented instead of a more comprehensive scheme.  
If the EU was to meet its Kyoto commitments by implementing the EU-ET Directive, as it 
stands today, this would cost around twenty times as much as implementing a fully 
comprehensive scheme. For Norway and the Rest of Annex B region the cost would by 
around 3-4 times greater if they were to implement the EU-ET scheme, or a similar 
differentiated  scheme.12 The absolute welfare losses are perhaps more informative to look at. 
These show that Norway would find such a system very inefficient, as it is only a very small 
share of the country’s emissions that take place within the sectors that are covered by the 
scheme. The other Annex B countries, as a group, would find the EU scheme less costly; a 
larger share of their emissions take place within the sectors that are included. These results 
make it all the more surprising that Norway has already chosen to adopt an emissions trading 
scheme closely based on the EU-ET scheme.  
The EU-ET scheme makes exemptions for large industries, notably the chemical and 
aluminium industries, and installations with significant greenhouse gas emissions. Also, CO2 
is the only greenhouse gas that is included in the EU-ET scheme. This paper shows that there 
is considerable scope for efficiency gains through including more sectors and gases. 
                                                     
12 Norway will decide in autumn 2004 whether to adopt the EU scheme. This scheme would cover only 
10% of Norway’s greenhouse gas emissions. Norway will therefore keep its CO2-tax, and the 
process industry has entered into a voluntary agreement with the government.  
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One main argument for making exemptions is that industries exposed to international 
competition might experience adverse effects on their competitiveness if they are covered by 
a scheme that their competitors are not. This paper shows that for the cases of the chemical 
and aluminium industries these exemptions are not necessarily very important; the major 
price changes occur when inputs into these industries become more expensive, and not when 
the sectors have a permit obligation themselves. Furthermore, exempting these sectors does 
not seem to be rational for society: The direct gain in revenue for the two sectors is only about 
half of the total welfare loss to society (and that does of course include the initial gain).  
The main conclusions are robust. The sensitivity analysis shows that changing some of the 
key assumptions of the model does not affect the major conclusions. However, there are some 
qualifications to this result. First of all, it should be noted that the coverage of the EU-ET 
scheme is indeed intended to be extended over time (Delbeke 2003). The EU will, of course, 
also undertake mitigation measures in the sectors that are exempted from the emissions 
trading. However, unless the EU is able to carry out abatement in other sectors at the exact 
same marginal abatement cost, some of the inefficiencies illustrated in this paper will 
materialize. 
The major weakness of this analysis is that the model does not include the monitoring and 
verification costs involved in an emissions trading system. Nor does the model include the 
structure of firms, i.e. it cannot distinguish between firms of different sizes. This is important, 
as the high cost of monitoring and verification was one of the EU’s arguments for exempting 
sectors and non-CO2 gases. This was also important in the decisions not to include small 
installations – where the monitoring and verification costs might be prohibitively high.  
Without including these transaction costs this paper cannot provide a full assessment of 
whether or not differentiation is a sound policy. However, the paper does show that the 
welfare losses (transactions costs not included) vary dramatically between the differentiated 
EU-ET scheme and a fully comprehensive scheme. This shows that at least there is 
considerable scope for improving efficiency – provided that transaction costs are not very 
large. Including certain sectors, such as transportation, through an upstream emissions trading 
system, would most likely not entail very large transaction costs (as systems for monitoring 
and verification are already in place due to the imposition of petrol taxes), and would improve 
the efficiency of the scheme.  
While this paper does not provide a full analysis of the issue, it does highlight some of the 
key economic impacts (both direction and magnitude) of implementing a differentiated 
emissions trading scheme. The large differences in welfare costs between a differentiated and 
a comprehensive scheme show that this is certainly a consideration that should enter into the 
policymaking process before measures for implementing the Kyoto Protocol are finalised.  
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